Bank Competition and Information Production
研究发现美国州际分行放松管制加剧了银行竞争，降低了银行收集借款人信息的积极性，尤其对信息不透明、依赖银行的企业和小银行影响更大。
Abstract We show that bank competition diminishes banks’ incentives to produce information about prospective borrowers. We exploit the deregulation of U.S. interstate branching as a shock to competition and use borrowers’ stock returns after loan announcements to measure bank information production. Positive loan announcement returns are reduced in states that deregulate interstate branching, especially for opaque and bank-dependent firms and smaller banks that rely on soft information. Existing (i.e., inside) banks reduce information production more than new (i.e., outside) banks after deregulation, suggesting that they do so to deter borrower poaching. Furthermore, the probability of a covenant violation increases following deregulation.