Trust me: Communication and Competition in a Psychological Game
通过理论和实验研究，在心理博弈框架下分析有无卖家竞争时的沟通游戏，发现同时考虑物质和心理收益时交易更多、质量略高且无福利损失，但竞争会因卖家不诚实增加而降低双方福利。
Abstract We study, both theoretically and experimentally, a communication game with and without seller competition and embed it in a psychological-game framework where players experience costs for lying, misleading others, and being disappointed. We derive the equilibrium predictions of this model, compare them to the setting without psychological payoffs, and test these predictions in a laboratory experiment, in which we induce both material and psychological payoffs. We find that the setting in which players have both material and psychological payoffs features more trade, trades goods of marginally better quality, and does so without welfare losses to either side of the market relative to the setting with material payoffs only. However, the introduction of competition counteracts this improvement and lowers welfare for both sides of the market. This happens due to a surge in dishonesty by sellers in the competitive setting and the buyers’ inability to detect this deception.