Reputation Effects under Short Memories
分析了在短记忆环境下，长期玩家与短期玩家之间的声誉博弈，发现长期玩家能近似获得承诺收益，而短期玩家的惩罚激励取决于记忆长度。
I analyze a reputation game between a patient player and a sequence of short-run players. Each short-run player observes the number of times that the patient player took each of his actions in the past K periods. When players have monotone supermodular payoffs, the patient player can approximately secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of K. I also show that the short-run players can approximately attain their highest feasible payoff in all equilibria if and only if K is lower than some cutoff. This is because a larger K weakens the short-run players’ incentives to punish the patient player.