Peer Response to Regulatory Enforcement: Lobbying by Non-Sanctioned Firms
研究竞争对手企业被处罚后，未受处罚的同行企业是否会增加针对处罚机构的游说活动，并探讨处罚严重性、声誉损害担忧和价值一致性等驱动因素。基于美国环保署违规案例验证假设。
Government agencies rely on general deterrence to protect the public. Firms utilize lobbying for influence and information purposes. This paper explores the intersection of general deterrence and lobbying by firms while investigating whether general deterrence efforts of regulators are met with a lobbying response. Specifically, we propose that following a competitor firm being sanctioned, the non-sanctioned peer firms will increase their amount of lobbying targeted at the sanctioning agency, and the key drivers of these increases in targeted lobbying will be penalty severity, concerns over likely reputational damage, and value alignment. We test our hypotheses using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency violations as a context, and they largely receive support.