Toeholds and information quality in common‐value takeover auctions
研究了在共同价值收购拍卖中，持股比例差异如何影响竞标者利用信息质量，发现信息质量在持股不均时显著影响竞价策略和最终价格。
Abstract In this article I analyze the effect of the sensitivity of firm value on the information available to potential acquirers in common‐value takeover auctions with toeholds. I show that the quality of information does not affect equilibrium when bidders have equal toeholds but has a significant effect when toeholds are different. My article demonstrates that increasing the relative information quality of the bidder with a smaller toehold makes both bidders bid more aggressively and leads to a higher price. I also analyze the combined effect of toeholds and information quality on equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss ways target shareholders can increase the expected final price.