Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement*
研究老产品制造商如何通过低于成本的批发价和未来降低固定费用的奖励，与零售商合谋阻止其销售改进型新产品，并比较了排他性交易和纵向合并的效果。
A manufacturer of an established product repeatedly interacts with a retailer that can sell an inferior new product thereby improving it. The manufacturer's exclusionary strategy consists of a permanently below‐cost wholesale price and “vertical collusion” with the retailer to exclude via a future reward of a reduced fixed fee. The latter tool is available only in an infinite game. Although contracts include fixed fees, the retailer sells the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. Exclusive dealing or a vertical merger between the manufacturer of the established product and the retailer replicate the vertically integrated outcome and increase prices.