Paying Managers of Complex Portfolios: Evidence on Compensation and Performance from Endowments
研究了捐赠基金首席投资官的薪酬结构，发现大型捐赠基金更倾向于使用奖金、招聘更强背景的CIO并支付更高薪酬，但薪酬与未来业绩关系较弱。
Abstract We examine compensation for endowment Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) overseeing portfolios with significant allocations to alternatives. We find widespread use of bonuses and that large endowments with high alternative allocations hire CIOs with stronger backgrounds, pay them more, and have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find weak evidence of a relationship between compensation and future performance. Our results align with contract theory predictions but differ from empirical findings on pension funds. Endowments pay CIOs more, rely more on bonuses, attract more experienced professionals, and have lower turnover than pensions. This suggests more effective talent management compared to politically influenced public pensions.