Due Diligence
建立了一个尽职调查模型，分析其对价格、收益和交易完成的影响。研究发现，收购方会进行“过多”的尽职调查，但这种做法仍能提高总剩余和卖方收益。
ABSTRACT We propose a model of due diligence and analyze its effect on prices, payoffs, and deal completion. In our model, if the seller accepts an offer, the winning bidder (or “acquirer”) can gather information and chooses when to complete the transaction. In equilibrium, the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence. Our quantitative results suggest that the magnitude of the distortion is economically significant. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller's payoff compared to a setting without due diligence. We use our framework to explore the timing of due diligence, bidder heterogeneity, and breakup fees.