Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse*
提出价格挤压的剥削性理论，认为纵向一体化企业可通过剥削下游竞争对手的效率收益获取超额利润，并分析了禁止价格挤压的利弊，有助于理解美欧案例法的差异。
The exclusionary theory of price squeezes, commonly debated in courts and among legal scholars, faces significant challenges. This paper introduces an exploitative rationale for price squeezes. A vertically integrated firm can exploit efficiency gains from a downstream competitor, thereby earning more than the monopoly profit, and price squeezing emerges as a necessary condition for such exploitation. Prohibiting price squeezes benefits the competitor and improves production efficiency, but may also lead to unintended, perverse effects. This paper lays an economic foundation for analyzing price squeeze cases and contributes to reconciling the divergence in the case laws between the United States and the European Union.