A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
研究了银行选择贷款标准（筛选借款人的成本）的动态过程，发现标准收紧会恶化借款人结构，进而激励未来更紧的标准，这种互补性会放大和延长经济衰退，并可能导致市场陷入低效的过紧标准。
Abstract We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.