Strangers’ property
研究发现，正规化产权不仅通过第三方执行保护陌生人财产，还通过一种独立于执行的机制，使人们更尊重陌生人的财产。在贝宁农村的随机实验表明，产权改革十年后，参与者从陌生人处拿走的钱显著减少。
Abstract Why are impartial institutions such as formalized property rights so important for the emergence of impersonal trade? Previous literature has stressed the role of such institutions in providing third-party enforcement to shield strangers from locals’ opportunism. We document the existence of a second mechanism based on the role of formalized property rights in inducing respect for the property of strangers, regardless of enforcement. Ten years after the randomized introduction of formal property rights across rural Benin, we conducted a taking-dictator-game experiment in which participants could appropriate the endowment of an anonymous stranger from a different village. Even if enforcement institutions are absent and peer effects are silenced by design, participants from villages where the reform was implemented took significantly less than those in control villages. We further give consideration to several possible transmission channels and discuss their plausibility.