Whistle‐blowing and the incentive to hire
研究了举报奖励的一个被忽视的成本：雇主可能根据员工成为举报人的概率而非生产力来做雇佣决策，并分析了基于生产力的奖励优于基于收益的奖励。
Abstract We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle‐blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle‐blower. We develop a three‐stage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistle‐blower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistle‐blowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivity‐based rewards are superior to benefit‐based rewards.