A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems based on the TAL family of rules
本文从策略角度分析破产问题，构造了一个参数化博弈，玩家选择参数后按TAL规则族分配资产，证明了纳什均衡的存在性，并给出了两玩家情形下的所有均衡解。
Abstract This paper analyzes bankruptcy problems from a strategic perspective using the parameterized TAL family of bankruptcy rules. We construct a strategic game where every player selects a parameter, and the rule from the TAL family that corresponds to the mean of the chosen parameters is used to divide the estate. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this strategic game. In particular, we provide the set of all Nash equilibria for two players, and for more players, we prove existence by constructing a Nash equilibrium of a particular form based on the notion of a pivotal player.