Excess control of family board seats and corporate innovation
研究发现家族企业董事会席位超额控制会降低创新投入、产出和效率，加剧第二类代理问题，并通过降低风险承担、增加融资约束和阻碍专业知识获取渠道发挥作用。
Abstract We examine the impact of board‐level control on corporate innovation in family firms. We find that excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is negatively correlated with innovation investment, innovation output and innovation efficiency. Our findings suggest that ECFBS exacerbates type II agency problems. Mechanistic analyses show that ECFBS reduces firms’ risk‐taking level, increases their financing constraints and damages channels for acquiring innovative professional knowledge. We also observe that effect of ECFBS on innovation is associated with family origin, familiarization time and family management characteristics. Our findings should be of interest to family firm manager investors and lenders who are interested in family governance mechanisms.