Heterogeneous paths to stability
研究发现，当临时合同的就业保护立法宽松时，将临时合同转为永久合同的激励措施效果减弱。基于行政数据，使用双重差分法估计，首次就业时签订更灵活合同的工人，在激励实施后转为永久就业的比例下降6.3个百分点，并导致两年内工资损失17%。
Abstract In this paper, we show that incentives to convert temporary contracts into permanent ones might be less effective when the employment protection legislation associated with temporary contracts is lax. Drawing upon rich administrative data and using a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate that workers at their first work experience hired on more flexible contracts undergo a reduction in the conversion rate to permanent employment of 6.3 percentage points after the implementation of the incentives (and of 3.2 percentage points over a year), compared to peers hired on more rigid contracts. This reduced conversion rate, which results in a 17% wage penalty even 2 years into their professional journey, points to a significant negative impact of flexible temporary jobs on the future prospects of young workers.