Flexible Moral Hazard Problems
研究代理人可选择任意产出分布时的道德风险问题，发展广义一阶方法刻画最优契约，发现工资随产出递增，并给出委托人最优分布的一阶条件。
This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort‐cost is smooth and increasing in first‐order stochastic dominance. To analyze this model, we develop a generalized notion of the first‐order approach applicable to optimization problems over measures. We demonstrate each output distribution can be implemented and identify those contracts that implement that distribution. These contracts are characterized by a simple first‐order condition for each output that equates the agent's marginal cost of changing the implemented distribution around that output with its marginal benefit. Furthermore, the agent's wage is shown to be increasing in output. Finally, we consider the problem of a profit‐maximizing principal and provide a first‐order characterization of principal‐optimal distributions.