Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete?
研究批发市场中公开标价如何影响供应商的合谋或竞争行为，发现标价既能通过多买家接触效应扩大合谋范围，也能通过承诺效应帮助供应商与大型买家谈判更优条件。
Abstract Collusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements of list prices extend the possibility of collusion from small to large buyers (the multi-buyer contact effect). When suppliers compete, these announcements provide them with commitment to negotiate better terms with large buyers (the commitment effect).