On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality
通过实验研究外生提供的工资不平等规范信息如何影响人们对工资差异的接受度，发现规范信息显著改变个体信念，但低不平等规范下雇主仍会大幅区分工资，且高不平等规范会提升低绩效员工产出。
This study investigates how the exogenous provision of norm information concerning wage inequality influences the acceptance of wage differences. In an experiment where one employer interacts with two employees who differ in productivities, two main treatments provide information suggesting either an injunctive norm for small or for large wage differences prior to the interaction. Norm-relevant information significantly shifts individual beliefs concerning the appropriateness of wage inequality: Subjects who receive information hinting at a norm for high (low) wage inequality are more (less) likely to consider larger wage differences to be appropriate. Yet, when a norm for low wage inequality is suggested, a non-negligible share of employers still differentiates strongly, making it difficult to coordinate on a commonly accepted norm for wage inequality. Moreover, norm information signaling high wage inequality positively affects the output of low-performing employees.