Workers' moral hazard and private insurer effort in disability insurance
利用荷兰企业残疾保险合同的行政数据，研究补充性私人残疾保险如何同时影响工人的道德风险和保险公司通过预防与复工活动降低赔付的努力，发现保险公司努力能抵消工人道德风险。
Abstract While it is well known that supplementary private Disability Insurance (DI) has the potential to increase workers' moral hazard, the extra coverage may also increase incentives for private insurers to reduce caseloads by means of prevention and reintegration activities. With unique administrative data on DI contracts of firms in the Netherlands, this paper aims to disentangle these worker and insurer responses to increased coverage. Supplementary insurance increases the insurers' incentive to lower disability risks, but in our setting it also creates an incentive for the insurers to facilitate partial work resumption of disabled workers who have earnings capacity. Using firm‐ and time‐fixed effects models on the absence and employment rates, we find that insurer effort counteracts workers' moral hazard.