Why Are Corporate Investment Horizons Shrinking? Uncovering the Spillover Effects of Shareholder Litigation
研究发现，当同行企业被股东起诉后，其他企业会缩短投资视野以提升短期业绩、避免自身被诉；长期股东或关注未来的CEO能缓解这一效应。
Existing research shows that shareholder pressures can shorten firms’ investment horizons. Yet studies have so far been limited to the actions shareholders take directly toward a focal firm. Considering that shareholder pressures may spill over between organizations, we argue that firms shorten their investment horizons following shareholder-initiated lawsuits against their peers in an effort to boost their short-run performance and preempt being sued themselves. We further posit that the negative relationship between this form of litigation threat and a firm’s investment horizon is weakened among firms with more long-term shareholders or future-focused CEOs, both of which guard against managers becoming overly short-term oriented. An examination of 18 years of shareholder litigation data supports our theory. This study highlights shareholder litigation as a distinct form of shareholder voice and one that is sufficiently potent to create spillover effects between firms.