Voting to persuade
研究了咨询委员会成员基于私人连续信号投票、决策者观察投票结果后决定是否采纳政策变更的集体说服模型，发现信息传递仅在一致同意投票时可能，且委员会足够大时能实现完全信息聚合。
We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous-signal model produces results different from discrete-signal models.