Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs
研究了两人有限策略随机博弈中，当玩家B的支付与玩家A以概率p相关时，纯纳什均衡的数量以及最佳反应动态几乎必然收敛到纯纳什均衡的条件。
We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p∈[0,1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p and is i.i.d. from the same uniform distribution with probability 1−p. This model interpolates the model of i.i.d. random payoff used in most of the literature and the model of random potential games. First we study the number of pure Nash equilibriums in the above class of games. Then we show that, for any positive p, asymptotically in the number of available actions, best response dynamics reaches a pure Nash equilibrium with high probability.