Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment
通过实验室实验，模拟当前器官移植中心与获取组织之间的博弈，发现现行规则导致器官回收和有益移植减少，而基于患者整体健康结果的联合奖励机制能改善行为。
We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.