Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints
研究了在无转移支付的经济中，通过伪市场机制有效配置不可分割商品的条件，证明了随机消费下瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在性与效率，并展示了如何通过偏好或生产技术处理个体与总量约束。
We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stochastic consumption. We demonstrate that constraints on minimum and maximum levels of individual consumption and aggregate constraints of the kind that are relevant in combinatorial allocation problems can be accommodated either by incorporating these constraints into individual preferences or by specifying a suitable production technology.