Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? Evidence from brokerage mergers and closures
研究发现，券商合并或关闭导致分析师覆盖减少后，竞争性行业企业的财务报告质量下降比非竞争性行业更严重，但管理层懈怠增加较少，表明竞争抑制了部分代理问题却加剧了其他问题。
Abstract We document that firms in competitive industries experience significantly more deterioration in financial reporting quality after a reduction in analyst coverage due to brokerage closures or mergers, as compared to firms in noncompetitive industries. Most of the effects are mainly driven by firms with smaller initial analyst coverage, lower institutional ownership and greater financial constraints. Importantly, we further show that after brokerage exits, managerial slack increases more for firms in noncompetitive than competitive industries. Consistent with the notion that agency manifestation can take different forms, we provide evidence that competition may curtail some agency issues, such as managerial slack, while also exacerbating other agency issues, such as financial misreporting.