Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication
研究了私人监测和直接沟通（廉价谈话）下重复博弈的一致严格均衡，刻画了极限均衡收益集，并给出了民间定理成立的条件。
Abstract Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated “folk theorems” have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient attention paid to the robustness of a large set of equilibria that is needed for such folk theorems. Starting with perfect public equilibrium as our starting point, we study uniformly strict equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring and direct communication (cheap talk). We characterize the limit equilibrium payoff set and identify the conditions for the folk theorem to hold with uniformly strict equilibrium.