Self-Insuring against Liability Risk: Evidence from Physicians’ Home Values in States with Unlimited Homestead Exemptions
研究发现，在允许无限宅基地豁免的州，医生通过增加住房投资来保护资产免受医疗事故索赔，住房价值比无豁免时高出13%，且该效应在责任风险更高时更显著。
We study whether individuals self-insure against uninsured liability risk by exploiting variations in state laws that allow individuals to protect some portion of the value of their homes against creditors. We test whether physicians take advantage of these laws to invest more in their homes to protect assets from malpractice claims exceeding liability policy limits. In states with unlimited homestead exceptions—laws that protect home equity from recovery by creditors—physicians invest 13 percent more in home value than in the absence of an exemption. Effects are larger where liability risk is greater; no effect occurs for other professionals of similar family income, family size, demographics, and city of residence. Our evidence suggests that individuals manipulate their financial assets to self-insure against liability risk when insurance markets are incomplete.