Inconsistency on Multimember Courts
研究了上诉法院和法官个人有时会做出不一致的判决，并论证提高法官个人一致性反而可能加剧法院整体的不一致问题，通过引入理性单调性公理证明了不存在同时满足该公理和标准阿罗假设的集体选择规则。
Appellate courts sometimes issue inconsistent decisions. Individual judges are sometimes inconsistent too. We argue that making judges more consistent could exacerbate the problem of inconsistent courts. We do so through a variant of Arrow’s model of preference aggregation in which preferences are complete but need not be transitive. We introduce an ordinal rationality measure to compare preference relations. Using this measure, we introduce a new axiom, monotonicity in rationality, which requires the collective preference to become more rational when individuals’ preferences become more rational. We show that no collective choice rule satisfies monotonicity in rationality and the standard Arrovian assumptions: unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.