When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms
研究股东协议在家族企业中如何通过限制家族所有者与其他家族成员之间的超级委托人代理冲突来增加企业价值，基于法国企业面板数据和IPO样本。
Researchers are divided on whether shareholder agreements (SAs) improve or hurt firm value. We offer family firms as a context where SAs add value and explain why; SAs limit “superprincipal” agency conflicts between family owners and other family members. A panel of French firms and a second study of French Initial Public Offerings show shareholders value SAs more in family than in nonfamily firms. Among family firms, SAs add greater value when weak governance undermines family owners’ resistance to other family members’ demands. Our study helps reconcile competing theory about SAs and distinguishes superprincipal conflicts from other family-firm agency problems.