Lender effects on gains from mergers and acquisitions
通过文本分析识别由企业贷款融资的并购，发现贷款融资的并购中收购方公告回报更高，并利用工具变量和准自然实验证明贷款人通过筛选和监督能力提升了收购方收益。
We employ textual analysis to identify mergers and acquisitions (M&As) financed by corporate loans and show that acquirer announcement returns are higher in loan-financed M&As. Utilizing an instrumental variable approach and a quasi-natural experiment, we provide evidence that lenders contribute to the higher acquirer returns in loan-financed M&As. Our findings support the view that lenders differ in their ability to screen and monitor borrowers and that their ability is persistent. We also find evidence that lenders’ participation in the M&A market can resolve uncertainty about M&A deal quality, improve corporate governance by preventing value-destroying M&As, and provide long-term monitoring benefits to acquirer shareholders.