Managerial discretion and debt financing under information uncertainty
研究信息不确定性如何影响管理层的融资决策和薪酬设计，发现不确定性会导致债权人低估债务价值，进而引发过度投资或投资不足，而薪酬结构可缓解代理冲突。
Abstract This study investigates how information uncertainty influences managers' decisions and compensation. It reveals varying financial choices under uncertainty levels. Initially, information uncertainty results in debtholders undervaluing debt in comparison to situations without such uncertainty. Consequently, they consistently estimate a default threshold that is lower than the threshold managers choose to maximize their value. Low uncertainty prompts overinvestment, heightening agency issues. Increased uncertainty leads debt holders to reduce the capital they are willing to lend to companies for investment. To invest early, funds must be injected or costs incurred. Information uncertainty can ease agency conflicts, shifting decisions from overinvestment to underinvestment. Managerial compensation matters: higher fixed salaries curb overinvestment, while increased reservation income exacerbates it.