Anglo–Dutch financial connections and contrasts in the late eighteenth century: The Amsterdam phase of the 1772–3 credit crisis
研究了1772-3年信贷危机在阿姆斯特丹的阶段，以英国同期经历为对比，发现危机主要通过东印度公司股票保证金贷款传导，而非汇票网络，荷兰内部信息低效和缺乏监管加剧了危机。
Abstract We examine the Amsterdam phase of the 1772–3 financial crisis using the British experience in the same episode as comparative context. We conclude that, notwithstanding some direct exposures by Amsterdam institutions to the principals of the London crisis, the main linkage between the two outbreaks was the requirement for cash margin on loans backed by British East India Company shares. No significant contagion via the bills of exchange network spread from London to Amsterdam in the period separating the two outbreaks, but some feeding back of distress to London is noticeable after the Dutch outbreak. The crisis was rooted in credit expansion, a deterioration in asset risk profiles, and speculation in West Indian mortgage securities and British equity markets. Speculators were enabled by information inefficiencies in the specialized and layered Amsterdam markets, and by the absence of a gatekeeper who could have regulated the provision of credit to them. To contain the outbreak, the Dutch drew on the cohesion of an informal club of insiders who led business and civic affairs. Though the credit markets resumed normal operations relatively quickly, the incurred losses were transformative for their long term prospects by devastating some of their most important firms.