Shedding light on foreign currency cash flow hedges: transparency and the hedging decision
研究ASU 2011-05强制提高其他综合收益报告透明度后，信息不对称是否降低、信息价值相关性是否改变、套期保值实践是否变化。发现透明报告降低了信息不对称，但进行现金流量套期保值的公司信息不对称更高；投资者惩罚OCI波动大的公司价值，管理者通过仅在股东权益表中报告OCI来缓解负面影响，透明报告后外币现金流量套期保值的可能性和水平均下降。
Abstract Utilizing firms in the S&P 500, we study whether greater transparency in the reporting of other comprehensive income (OCI) items, as mandated by ASU 2011-05, resulted in a reduction in information asymmetry, a change in the value relevance of this information, or a change in hedging practice. Our results show that while transparent reporting reduced information asymmetry, firms that engage in cash flow hedging do have greater information asymmetry than their counterparts that do not hedge. We find evidence that investors penalize firm value for greater volatility of OCI relative to net income volatility when reported transparently. When permitted, managers were able to mitigate the negative impact by reporting OCI only in the Statement of Shareholders’ Equity. We conclude that managers’ concerns regarding potential confusion surrounding OCI volatility following more prominent reporting led to changes in hedging behavior. After transparent reporting, we find a reduced likelihood of foreign currency cash flow (FXCF) hedges and a reduced level of FXCF hedging among firms experiencing the greatest volatility of unrealized hedging gains and losses.