Stress test precision and bank competition
研究了银行在压力测试结果公开披露下如何选择资产组合，发现竞争性银行会因测试精度提高而选择更冒险的资产，但配置效率提升；市场势力强的银行则选择更安全的资产，且不透明反而有利于稳定。
We study a banking sector in which banks choose their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. Competitive banks must gamble, choosing assets that are riskier the more precise is the stress test. Allocative efficiency, however, improves with precision. When risk taking is not too sensitive to the precision of information, maximal transparency maximizes both stability and surplus. In contrast, banks with market power select safer assets, and opacity maximizes stability, as well the surplus if the social cost of bank failure is significant.