Judicializing Public Interests: Administrative Performance Under the Shadow of Judicial Review
研究中国环境公益诉讼如何通过“司法审查阴影下的讨价还价”机制，迫使行政机关提升执法绩效，并发现该效应受公众关注度和上级重视程度调节。
Do active judicial reviews bring about better administrative performance? Most scholars argue that active judicial review creates animosity between the judiciary and administration, leading to bad administrative performance. Others advocate that the relationship is not so much hostile as it is constructive. However, the actual impact of and mechanisms enabling such a constructive relationship remain unclear. Employing an analysis of Public Interest Litigation against the Administration ( PILA) in environmental protection cases in China, we present a theory of “bargaining in the shadow of judicial review.” The threat of imminent judicial review forces the administration to negotiate with the prosecutor and enhance its performance in exchange for dropping charges. Additionally, the effect of PILA is stronger in regions with more public environmental concern and weaker in regions where the higher-level public administration pays greater attention to environmental protection. Furthermore, we identify the impact of PILA on local governments’ enforcement efforts and its legitimacy. The present study sheds new light on the long-standing debate on managerialism versus legalism.