Are Companies Offloading Risk onto Employees in Times of Uncertainty? Insights from Corporate Pension Plans
研究发现，当经济政策不确定性上升时，美国上市公司会提高养老金资金不足的程度，将风险转嫁给员工，而财务困境和信息不对称是潜在渠道，CEO薪酬结构等公司特征会加剧这一效应，工会和社会资本则能缓解。
Abstract We investigate how firms adjust corporate pension plans in response to economic policy uncertainty (EPU). Using a sample of US-listed firms, we find that firms increase pension underfunding levels when facing higher EPU. The result is robust to controlling for pension portfolio returns, discount rates, plan sizes, pension liability, numbers of employees, other macroeconomic factors, difference-in-differences and instrumental variable estimation, and additional evidence of pension risk-shifting. Further analysis reveals that financial distress and information asymmetry induced through EPU are the potential channels. The effect is stronger for firms having CEOs being excessively paid, using cash flow as a performance metric in CEO compensation, paying high dividends, and having short-term institutional investors, whereas the presence of unions, positive corporate culture, and social capital alleviate the effect. Notably, managers, not shareholders, appear to be the party reaping the benefits. Our findings suggest that firms may shift risk to employees in response to heightened uncertainty and institutional characteristics play a moderating role in this crucial business ethics issue.