Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences
研究了当代理人具有参考依赖偏好时，如何最优设计激励合同，发现当代理人损失厌恶或敏感性递减足够强时，最优合同必须包含奖金。
We investigate the optimal design of incentives when agents exhibit reference dependence. The theoretical framework of this paper incorporates the most prominent accounts of reference-dependent preferences and the most frequently used reference point rules. Such a general treatment of preferences allows us to characterize sufficient conditions on preference for the optimality of bonuses. We find that the optimal contract must include a bonus when agents suffer from loss aversion or exhibit sufficiently strong diminishing sensitivity. Moreover, we show that such a result holds when the reference point is either exogenous or deterministic. This paper provides a rationale for incentive schemes including bonuses grounded in preference.