Denial of interoperability and future first-party entry
受谷歌反垄断案启发，研究平台在尚未进入下游时拒绝第三方应用互操作性的动机，发现数据驱动的跨期网络效应使拒绝访问成为长期有利的封锁策略，并评估强制访问或数据共享政策的效果。
Motivated by a recent antitrust case involving Google, we develop a rationale for foreclosure when the owner of an essential input is not yet integrated downstream. Our theory rests on data-enabled network effects across periods. If a platform considers offering a first-party app in the future, by not allowing a third-party app to be hosted on its platform, it ensures that the third-party app would be a weaker competitor to its own app in the future. This makes denial of access attractive as a full or partial foreclosure strategy, which is costly in the short term but may be beneficial in the long term. We also study the effects of policies such as compulsory access or data-sharing, showing under which conditions they might be beneficial to consumers or backfire.