Combinable products, price discrimination, and collusion
研究了当消费者可以组合产品以获得更好匹配时，不同定价方案（两部收费、线性定价、固定费用）对横向差异化企业维持合谋能力及消费者福利的影响。
We analyze the effect of different pricing schemes on the ability of horizontally differentiated firms to sustain collusion when customers are able to mix products to achieve a better match of their preferences. We compare the impacts on the likelihood of collusion and on consumer welfare from three pricing schemes: two-part tariffs, linear prices, and quantity-independent fixed fees. We find that a ban of either price component of the two-part tariff makes it more difficult to sustain collusion at profit-maximizing prices. We also find that whereas linear pricing is the most beneficial pricing schedule for customers in the absence of collusion, it is the most harmful pricing schedule for customers in the presence of collusion.