Financing innovation: A hurdle rate theory of inventive procyclicality
研究提出发明顺周期性的门槛收益率理论，发现美国企业的高股权风险溢价会抑制创新，因为高贴现率使研发项目难通过预算决策。财务松弛、竞争弱和长期机构持股能缓解影响，且高溢价时期产生的专利影响更大。
Schumpeterian arguments of ''creative destruction'' predict that innovation is countercyclical. However, empirical findings demonstrate the contrary. We apply corporate finance principles to innovation economics and propose a ''hurdle-rate theory of inventive procyclicality.'' Macroeconomic episodes of high equity risk premia (ERP) stifle innovation in our sample of U.S. firms because many R&D projects do not pass corporate budgeting decisions when the aggregate discount rate is high. Consistent evidence suggests that the discount rate effect is less pronounced in firms with financial slack, weak product market competition, and institutional investor ownership with long-term orientation. In an attempt to reconcile our procyclical empirical evidence with Schumpeter’s countercyclical theory, we show that firms engaging in exploratory research suffer less during high-ERP episodes than those focusing on exploitative research, and patents developed during high-ERP periods have a higher technological impact and receive significantly more forward citations. Finally, we exploit the staggered variation in state-level R&D tax credits in difference-in-differences analyses to establish a causal link between the ERP and patent value.