Does employee ownership improve labour investment efficiency? Evidence from European firms
研究了欧洲企业中非高管员工持股对劳动投资效率的影响，发现员工持股能降低信息不对称和改善管理监督，从而减少劳动投资低效，尤其对信息不对称严重或代理问题突出的企业效果更明显。
This paper studies the impact of non-executive employee ownership on labour investment efficiency for a sample of European firms. It empirically documents a negative association between employee ownership and labour investment inefficiency, which serves an inverse measure of labour investment efficiency. This negative association is notably more pronounced for firms reporting higher discretionary accruals in their financial statements (i.e. firms with higher information asymmetry) and for those with a lower percentage of independent directors (i.e. firms with greater agency problems). As such, this paper offers evidence that employee shareholding enhances employment decisions through two channels: reduced information asymmetry and improved management monitoring.