Higher agency costs in smaller firms? The role of size and reporting requirements in agency conflicts
研究了私营企业中因所有权与控制权分离导致的纵向代理成本，发现小公司代理成本更高，且弱报告要求会放大这一效应，对理解代理成本的决定因素有重要贡献。
Abstract Our paper investigates vertical agency conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and control in privately held firms. Vertical agency conflicts can lead to vertical agency costs resulting from bonding costs, monitoring costs, and residual losses. More specifically, we focus on the roles of firm size and corporate reporting requirements in the level of these costs. We demonstrate that vertical agency costs are higher in smaller, privately held firms because shareholders have less monitoring capacity and limited access to the labor market. Furthermore, vertical agency costs in smaller firms are amplified in countries characterized by relatively weaker reporting requirements because shareholders have less information available to assess managers' actions. We suggest for the first time that firm size and strength of auditing and reporting requirements are essential to understanding agency costs' magnitude in privately held firms. Our analysis also offers a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that explain agency costs in privately held firms. Thus, this study poses important implications for public policy, as disclosure requirements are a major issue for many countries.