How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts
研究了在多方暴力冲突中，增强或削弱某一方的力量如何通过冲突网络产生连锁效应，导致冲突投资重新分配，并降低总体冲突投资。
Abstract Governments and multilateral organisations often attempt to influence multi-sided violent conflicts by supporting or undermining one of the conflicting parties. We investigate the (intended and unintended) consequences of strengthening or weakening an agent in a multi-sided conflict. Using a conflict network based on Franke and Öztürk (J Public Econ 126:104–113, 2015), we study how changing the strength of otherwise symmetric agents creates knock-on effects throughout the network. Increasing or decreasing an agent’s strength has the same unintended consequences. Changes in the strength of an agent induce a relocation of conflict investments: Distant conflicts are carried out more fiercely. In line with previous results, asymmetry reduces aggregate conflict investments. In the case of bipartite networks, with two conflicting tacit groups with aligned interests , agents in the group of the (now) strong or weak agent face more intense conflicts. Furthermore, in conflicts where the (now strong or weak) agent is not involved, the probabilities of winning remain unchanged compared to the symmetric case.