A model of risk sharing in a dual labor market
研究了在有限承诺下，风险规避工人与动态雇佣合同如何导致永久与临时工作共存，发现临时合同会挤占永久岗位且不增加就业。
In OECD countries, the labor market features a coexistence of open-ended, permanent jobs subject to strict employment protection and fixed-term, temporary jobs. This paper studies a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers and dynamic employment contracts subject to limited commitment. In equilibrium, permanent and temporary jobs coexist when the match quality is sufficiently dispersed: firing costs generate insurance gains implying that permanent contracts are optimal for high-quality matches. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, quantitative analysis of the model shows that temporary contracts crowd out permanent jobs and do not generate employment gains.