Old-age support policy and fertility with strategic bequest motives
研究了公共养老支持如何影响个体的生育决策和长期均衡，发现策略性遗赠动机可能导致生育率高于社会最优水平。
Abstract This paper presents an analysis of the effects of public old-age support on individuals’ fertility decisions and on the long-term equilibrium in an overlapping generation economy with strategic bequest motives. Parents must pay their adult children at least the reservation wage to receive informal old-age support from them (individual rationality constraint). Formal old-age support is financed through wage taxes on children. The increased present value of formal old-age support tends to increase old-age utility, thereby decreasing the family support demand and decreasing savings for the old age. The increased wage tax reduces the opportunity cost of child-rearing time, thereby increasing the fertility rate. The effects of increased formal old-age support on per-worker capital and labor are indeterminate, as is the effect on the long-term lifetime utility of individuals. A strategic bequest motive might engender a higher fertility rate than that of the social optimum.