Protecting Your Friends: The Role of Connections in Division Manager Careers
研究发现，与CEO有关系的部门经理离职率更低、晋升率更高，即使业绩不佳也受到保护，且这种保护在治理薄弱的环境中更明显，外部市场对其能力持怀疑态度。
Abstract We find that division managers who are connected to the CEO are substantially less likely than others to depart from the firm and are more likely to be promoted. Connected managers are protected when performance is poor, and they display no special ability to improve performance given this protection. Connections matter more in weak governance/incentive environments, and the external labor market and stock market appear skeptical of connected managers’ talents. While much of the evidence suggests inefficient favoritism, connected managers are protected more in peripheral segments, suggesting a possible efficiency benefit in helping to resolve intrafirm information problems.