Do corporate site visits affect the informational role of independent directors?
研究了中国上市公司独立董事的实地考察活动如何影响其获取和传播公司特定信息，发现实地考察能增强独立董事的信息角色，尤其对信息环境复杂、专有成本低的公司效果更明显。
Abstract This study examines the influence of corporate site visits on information acquisition and dissemination by independent directors (IDs). Employing two unique sources of data from Chinese listed firms based on the mandatory disclosure of IDs’ (i) site visit activities and (ii) opinions about corporate decisions, we find that the acquisition of firm‐specific information and the dissemination of such information to the market are greater among IDs who conduct visits than their counterparts without such visits. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced in firms with complex information environments, in firms with lower proprietary costs, and among IDs with greater internal information asymmetry, superior external information, and stronger incentives and abilities to perform their duties. Furthermore, the firm‐specific information disseminated by IDs leads to stronger market reactions and improves stock price efficiency. Our study shows that site visits contribute to the informational role of IDs, and our evidence offers important corporate governance and regulatory implications.