CEO overcaution and capital structure choices
本文提出并检验了考虑CEO过度谨慎偏好的资本结构权衡理论新版本，发现过度谨慎的CEO会低估债务价值，从而选择更低杠杆甚至零杠杆政策。
Abstract This paper develops and empirically tests a new version of the trade‐off theory of corporate capital structure choices that accounts for CEOs' biased beliefs, with a focus on overcaution. We characterize the bias as a distortion of expected rates of return on equity and debt that, for Overcautious CEOs, are overestimated compared to a rational CEO. The theory shows that if CEOs have higher bias in equity, than in debt‐value estimation, overcautious CEOs will choose lower levels of debt compared to rational CEOs, and, if the degree of overcaution is sufficiently high, they will adopt a zero‐leverage policy.