The effect of SEC regulatory oversight on implied cost of equity
研究美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的监管监督如何影响公司权益资本成本，发现靠近SEC办公室的公司因披露质量提升而资本成本下降，对治理薄弱的企业效果更显著。
Abstract We examine the effect of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) oversight on the cost of equity. We argue that companies near regulatory oversight by the SEC are subject to increased scrutiny. Such heightened scrutiny, which is associated with enhanced disclosure quality, ultimately leads to a reduction in the cost of equity. We find empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Importantly, the cost of equity declines significantly when firms relocate their headquarters close to SEC office. Our results suggest that SEC effective external monitoring lowers the cost of equity for firms with weak governance.