How do executive excess compensation affect enterprise technological innovation: Evidence from a panel threshold model of chinese biopharmaceutical companies
研究中国上市生物医药公司的高管超额薪酬在什么区间能促进技术创新质量和效率，发现适度超额薪酬（0.0592-0.1907）能提升创新质量，但对效率有微弱负面影响。
This study examines the levels of executive excess compensation (EEC) that stimulate the quality and efficiency of enterprise technology innovation (ETI). Using a behavioral agency perspective, we investigate how companies achieve superior ETI by providing sufficient incentives to motivate executives to perform to the best of their abilities. We use a panel threshold model based on a sample of Chinese-listed biopharmaceutical companies and find that: (1) providing an EEC between 0.0592 and 0.1907 significantly affects the promotion of ETI quality; (2) regarding ETI efficiency, executives generally do not receive the compensation that they deserve; and (3) the existing EEC has a weak negative impact on ETI efficiency, gradually disappearing as compensation increases. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that restricting EEC to the eastern area and strengthening the supervision of EEC in state-owned enterprises are effective measures for stimulating ETI. We advance the literature by providing guidance on compensation plans to companies in different regions.